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ABSTRACT
PEOPLE REMEMBER LIKED POLITICAL POLICIES AS HAVING BEEN ATTRIBUTED
TO THEIR OWN PARTY
A robust finding in psychology shows that people tend to like information more when it
supports their existing beliefs, or comes from their own ingroup, a finding known as motivated
reasoning. These findings are especially prominent in a political context. Quite consistently,
research suggests people increase their liking of political information like political policies when
they are attributed to their own party. What is unknown, however, is if people also tend to
attribute personally liked information to their own party. These studies were conducted to
investigate this question.
Two, within-subjects studies were conducted. In both, participants (undergraduate
students) saw various political policies and indicated their liking for each. After a delay, the
policies were randomly attributed to either the Democrat or Republican party and participants
indicated their liking for each again. After another delay, participants saw all policies again in
the context of a memory task. For each policy, participants indicated which party they
remembered it was attributed to and their confidence in that memory. Participants also responded
to items that measured their political sophistication, political identity fusion, and political
identity investment. Collectively, the results of the study provided evidence that people
remembered personally liked policies as being attributed to their own party. It also suggests that
political sophistication may moderate this effect in some fashion. Finally, people seemed to
increase their liking for policies that were attributed to their own party and decrease their liking
for policies attributed to the opposing party.
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Introduction
The theory of motivated reasoning posits that when people are presented information, a
subconscious process takes place that can alter opinions. Rather than strictly evaluating
information, people also consider whether the information supports their group, social identity,
and/or beliefs (Taber & Lodge, 2016), which can have a biasing influence in almost every type
of reasoning (Kraft et al., 2015; Taber & Lodge, 2006). Druckman and McGrath (2019) suggest
that people can be motivated to come to conclusions that support their existing beliefs
(ideological motivation) or motivated to come to conclusions that are accurate, regardless of their
existing beliefs (accuracy motivation). However, even accuracy motivation can be biased, as
instance, a liberal may consider
information from CNN as accurate, and information from Fox News as inaccurate, without
properly evaluating the content provided (Druckman & McGrath, 2019).
Various research demonstrates the ubiquity of motivated reasoning. People have been
shown to be motivated to question negative outcomes but accept positive outcomes at face value.
For instance, people tend to doubt the efficacy of a medical test that indicates that they have a
fictitious disease, but if the same test indicates they do not have a disease, they are more willing
to take the results at face value (Ditto et al., 2003). Motivated reasoning is also used in other selfserving ways. Sinclair and Kunda (1999) found that, when interacting with various Black
professionals (e.g., doctor, manager, evaluator), participants often inhibited stereotypes about the
professionals depending on how they perceived the interaction went. If they felt the interaction

stereotypes; if it was a negative interaction, they did the opposite.
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Motivated reasoning is especially prominent in the political realm. With respect to how
motivated reasoning has been examined in the arena of politics, two common paradigms look
either at how ideologically congruent/incongruent information is viewed, or at how neutral
/outgroup is viewed. In both cases,
ideologically congruent information is preferred and otherwise evaluated more positively. Taber
and Lodge (2006) found that people rate arguments that support their existing beliefs as stronger
than arguments that oppose their beliefs, even if those arguments are objectively of similar
strength. They also found that people spent more time processing belief-challenging arguments,
possibly because they were forming strong arguments against them (Taber & Lodge, 2006).
Similarly, research has found that people tend to seek out information that supports their existing
political beliefs, selecting it more than belief-challenging information (Graf & Aday, 2008;
Knobloch-Westerwick et al., 2020). This finding is commonly known as confirmation bias, the
Confirmation
bias is found in several different avenues of research. For example, people that prefer healthiness
over tastiness in food selections tend to seek out videos that promote healthy food preferences, as
well as rate health promoting arguments as stronger than arguments promoting tastiness
(Dickinson & Kakoschke, 2021).
Motivated reasoning extends into other aspects of the political world, such as conspiracy
theories. One study found that conspiracy theories were rated as more believable when they were
s ideology, as opposed to ideologically incongruent conspiracies
(Miller et al., 2016). A specific example of this is election fraud conspiracy theories, where both
liberals and conservatives were more likely to endorse theories when they implicated the
opposing party (Edelson et al., 2017). Similar findings were also found in research on climate
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change, in which participants were more likely to deny scientific findings if they disconfirmed
existing climate change beliefs (Washburn & Skitka, 2018). Collectively, this research supports
the idea that people reason with information in motivated ways to support their own political
beliefs and party.
Considering how neutral information attribute
research in this area shows that ingroup attribution boosts evaluation of the information, relative
to unattributed information. Bolsen et al. (2014) presented ideologically neutral policies to
participants with either no attribution, attribution to the Republicans, or attribution to the
Democrats. They found that policies attributed to

ingroup party received more

support than a policy with no attribution, while policies attributed to the opposing party received
decreased support relative to non-attributed policies.
Similar findings appear in studies examining the concept of reactive devaluation. In
research on this concept, participant liking of policy proposals is driven by which party or
group the proposals are attributed to. For example, both Israelis and Palestinians were more
likely to reject a peace proposal when attributed to the opposing group, but more likely to accept
and support the same proposal when attributed to their own group, as compared to control groups
where the policy was presented without attribution (Maoz et al., 2002). This offers strong
support to the idea that people evaluate information in the context of where it comes from and
whether it is consistent with their pre-existing beliefs, not simply the content in the information.
Although much research demonstrates an increased preference for ideologically
consistent information, as well as increased liking for ingroup attributed information, research
does not yet show whether people also attribute personally liked information to their own groups.
That is, it is known that people like information that is consistent with their own ideology, and
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that people like information more if they believe it came from their own group. What is unknown
is whether a liking of unattributed neutral information will make people think their own group
proposed it. If people initially like a neutral political stimulus, will they believe their own party
proposed it, regardless of actual attribution? Social identity theory suggests that this may be the
case.
Historically, social identity theory research has shown that people exhibit a clear
preference for their ingroup compared to the outgroup (Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel et al., 1971). In a
review of literature, Hewstone et al. (2002) discuss evidence that people tend to show an inherent
ingroup favoritism, including an increased trust, positive regard, and empathy to ingroup
members. They also suggest that people tend to show outgroup derogation, with negative
emotions toward outgroup members such as disgust, contempt, and anger. A more recent review
from Everett et al. (2015) argues that ingroup favoritism may be driving biases toward the
ingroup, which sometimes may contribute to outgroup derogation (e.g., zero-sum conflicts). A
study that exemplifies these effects was conducted by Johnson et al. (2012). They found that as
Christian identification increased, people tended to show increased liking toward valueconsistent ingroups (ingroup favoritism) and increased disliking for value-violating outgroups
(outgroup derogation).
So, social identity theory suggests people inherently like their ingroup and see it, and its
members, positively, while they may also have inherent disdain for the opposing group. The
motivated reasoning literature is broadly consistent with this. It suggests that people also show
increased liking for information attributed to the ingroup, and decreased liking for outgroupattributed information. In other words, if something comes from the ingroup, it must be good; if
it comes from the outgroup, it must be bad. One implication of this thinking is that if a person
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likes information, such as a neutral political policy, they may tend to remember it coming from
If they dislike that information, they may remember it as coming from the
Furthermore, it appears this finding would be largely consistent with existing
schematic memory research.
Schemas are cognitive structures that people use to represent useful characteristics of
concepts and can be quite influential in memory (Alba & Hasher, 1983). Research into schematic
memory is quite prevalent, however often produces somewhat contradictory findings. One study
found that people recalled the actions of an individual better when they contradicted how the
individual was described (Pryor et al., 1986). Similarly, Yamada and Itsukushima (2013) found
that people recalled household objects better when they were used in schematically inconsistent
ways compared to consistent ways (e.g., a dinner plate is better remembered when somebody
used it like a phone). However, they also found consistent and inconsistent actions (e.g., sitting
on a chair; using the phone to cook dinner) were remembered equally, a somewhat contradictory
finding. Stern et al. (1984) also found that inconsistent and consistent actions of individuals and
groups were remembered at similar rates, and both were remembered better than irrelevant
neutral information. Lodge and Hamill (1986) provide additional contradictory evidence in the
political realm. In their study, Lodge and Hamill created a fake politician, assigned them a
Democrat or Republican identifier, and designed a hypothetical policy book containing 30
policies consistent with the ideology of the politician, and 10 inconsistent policies. After
participants looked through the policy book and completed a distractor task, a surprise memory
task was presented. This memory task showed 20 old policies that were in the policy book and
20 new policies, half of which were schema-consistent and half schema-inconsistent. They found
that when people were not very knowledgeable on politics, they remembered consistent and
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inconsistent policies at the same rate. Highly knowledgeable participants, however, tended to
remember consistent policies better than inconsistent.
One factor that may contribute to these contradicting findings is the difficulty of the
recall task. Difficult tasks require more cognitive effort to successfully complete. Research has
shown that when people have access to schemas (and stereotypes), they often use them to
decrease the cognitive effort used in recall (Macrae et al., 1994) or problem solving (Wang et al.,
2018). This is incredibly useful when the information provided is consistent with existing
schemas but can be problematic when the information is not. Recall that Lodge and Hamill
(1986) had participants learn 40 different policies, a quite demanding task, while intermixing
schema consistent and inconsistent policies. The demanding nature of the task could explain why
consistent policies were remembered better than inconsistent; schemas were relied upon to lower
cognitive effort and led to an improved memory for policies that were consistent with the
40 policies were ideologically consistent, they might have been
remembered quite well. Another factor that may contribute to these contradicting findings is
timing; the longer the delay before recall, the more people may rely on schemas in the memory
task. Kleider et al. (2008) support this idea, finding that in an immediate memory task, people
remembered consistent and inconsistent actions at a similar rate. When the test was delayed for
two days, consistent actions were remembered better than inconsistent ones. This timing issue
was considered while developing the current studies.
In the described schema studies, only one was political (Lodge & Hamill, 1986), and it
utilized policies that were politically charged and clearly fit into existing schemas of the major
political parties. Can neutral political policies also fit into existing political schemas? They might
if

Due to the nature of
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politics, a schema for each political party might also include general positive and negative
feelings for each group. The previously reviewed social identity theory literature does suggest
people often form inherent positive feelings for the ingroup and outgroup negativity (Everett et
al., 2015; Hewstone et al., 2002). A conservative could form schemas that suggest Republicans
tend to have positive policies and Democrats tend to have negative polices (and vice versa for
liberals). If this is the case, schema-consistent memory might take the form of people
remembering liked policies as coming from their own party and disliked policies as coming from
the opposing party.
Other literature suggests that memory can be deployed in biased ways, typically in a
fashion that supports memory for information about, or coming from, ingroup members. For
instance, people have been shown to remember faces of perceived ingroup members better than
outgroup faces (Rule et al., 2007). People have also been shown to recall actions of ingroup
members better than those of the outgroup (Greenstein et al., 2016), as well as remember
information presented by ingroup members better than information presented by outgroup
members (Iacozza et al., 2019). Collectively, these studies suggest that individuals have the
capacity, whether knowingly or not, to deploy memory in biased ways. Research into false
political memories has suggested that people even sometimes misremember political events that
never actually occurred. Frenda et al. (2013) found that people tended to remember fictious
political events that implicated the opposing party in negative actions (e.g., liberals remembered
George Bush going on a golfing trip immediately following Hurricane Katrina). Not only did
people indicate they heard about the fabricated events, but a large proportion reported having
first-hand knowledge of the fabricated events. Similarly, Coronel et al. (2014) found that people
tended to misremember hypothetical politicians supporting party-consistent policies, whether the
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politicians supported the policies or not. Coronel and colleagues also utilized event related
potential (ERP) analysis in their study. Interestingly, they found that the ERP responses when
participants misremembered a politician supporting a party-consistent policy were quite similar
to ERP responses of standard, accurate memories. This suggested that participants responses
went beyond educated guessing and were instead indicative of false memories.
The reviewed literature suggests that people seem to desire to remember in ways that
supports their ideology, group, and existing world beliefs. This is supported by schema research
(Lodge & Hamill, 1986) and other false memory research (Coronel et al., 2014; Frenda et al.,
2013). There is still a noticeable gap in this literature, however. As discussed earlier, motivated
reasoning research has investigated how evaluations of neutral information change when
attributed to different groups (Bolsen et al., 2014; Maoz et al., 2002). To the best of my
knowledge, an investigation of how evaluations of neutral political information influence
memory has not been conducted. There is no definitive answer as to whether people will tend to
remember liked neutral political information as having come from their own party or disliked
information as having come from the opposing party. The studies in this project were conducted
in an attempt to fill this gap.
To effectively answer the above question, I designed and conducted two within-subjects
studies. In both studies, participants were shown neutral political policies

policies not

stereotypically associated with either major political party at the time of their generation

and

indicated their liking for each. After a delay, the policies were attributed to either the Democrat
or Republican party and participants indicated their liking for each policy again. Then, after
another delay, participants completed a surprise memory task in which they indicated which
party they believed each policy was attributed to and their confidence in that assertion. I
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hypothesized that when participants were asked to recall which party various political policies
were attributed to, they would tend to remember policies they initially liked as coming from their
preferred political party and policies they initially disliked as coming from the opposing political
party. For a secondary hypothesis, I expected participants to increase their liking for political
policies when attributed to their own political party and decrease their liking for political policies
when attributed to the opposing political party. This hypothesis is consistent with existing
motivated reasoning literature.
In the following, I describe two studies in which these hypotheses were tested. I treated
the first study as a pilot study to investigate these hypotheses and lay a foundation for the
preregistered second study. The second study was conducted to replicate and extend the findings
of the first, making methodological improvements to address limitations observed in the initial
research. Furthermore, potential moderating variables were also investigated in the second study.
These variables are discussed after the findings of the first pilot study are presented.
Study 1
This initial study was conducted to test both hypotheses described above. To do this,
participants were presented with 12 neutral political policies not known to be affiliated with
either major American political party and indicated their liking or disliking of the policies. After
48 hours, participants returned for a second part of the study in which they were presented the
policies again, this time randomly attributed to either the Democrat or Republican party.
Participants again indicated their liking for the policies. After a short delay filled with unrelated
distractor tasks, participants were presented with the policies a final time and asked to indicate
which party they remembered the policy being attributed to, as well as their confidence in their
memory.
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Method
Participants
The sample utilized for this initial study was comprised of undergraduate students at
Western Kentucky University. All participants received partial course credit for their
participation. The final sample consisted of 159 (127 female; 28 male; 4 non-binary or other)
participants. The mean age for this sample was M = 19.4 years old (SD = 3.01). The sample was

Four participants indicated their data should be excluded when asked at the end of the project
(indicated they did not pay attention when responding in a question at the end of the
questionnaire). They were excluded from analysis, leaving a final sample of 155 participants.
Figure 1
Distribution of Political Ideology in Study 1

Design
The first study had a two-part, within-subjects design using both measured and
manipulated variables. There were 3 predictor variables, two of which were measured (true
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liking of political policies and political ideology) and one that was manipulated (random
attribution of policies to the Democrat or Republican party). For this manipulated variable,
randomization was counterbalanced. Policies were randomly assigned to two blocks prior to the
study (6 policies to each block). Within the study, one policy block was randomly assigned to
one of the parities, and the other to the other party, separately for each participant. There were
two outcome variables: attributed policy liking and memory for policy attribution.
Procedure
To administer the study, I designed a questionnaire using the online questionnaire design
service Qualtrics. This questionnaire was administered to the participants via Study Board, the
online research participation tool for psychological studies at Western Kentucky University. The
researchers did not have any personal contact with participants, and the entire procedure was
carried out online.
A two-part procedure was utilized. In part one, participants were presented with 12
hypothetical political policies. These political policies were designed to be politically neutral,
meaning that either political party realistically might support them (e.g., policy to offer tax
breaks to families that adopt children). A full list of the political policies can be found in
Appendix A. It should be noted that there were no analyses conducted on these policies to ensure
neutrality. This limitation is discussed later and addressed in the second study. Participants
indicated their liking for each of these policies before the policies were attributed to a party. For
future reference, this liking measure will be called the true liking score.
Forty-eight to seventy-two hours later, participants completed part two. Participants first
indicated their political ideology by indicating their level of liberalism/conservatism and to what
extent they identified as a Republican or Democrat. These scores made up the political ideology
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score. All 12 political policies were then presented again, randomly attributed to either the
Republican or Democratic party as described in the design. Respondents indicated their liking for
each attributed policies, with scores referred to as the attributed policy liking.
Immediately following this attributed policy liking measure, participants completed a
series of distractor tasks. Following these distractor tasks, the 12 policies were presented again in
the context of a memory task. Participants indicated which party they remembered the policy had
been attributed to, as well as their confidence in this assertion. This memory measure was used
for the memory for policy attribution variable.
Measures
True Liking. True liking of policies was a predictor variable. All 12 political policies
were presented to participants in part one of the study, unattributed to either party at the time.
Participants indicated their liking of each policy by responding to a 7-point Likert scale (1:
Extremely Oppose...7: Extremely Support). A mean score was calculated for both blocks of
policies. This provided a mean true liking score for policies that would, in the next part of the
study, be attributed to Republicans and another for policies that would be attributed to
Democrats.
Political Ideology. Political ideology was the second predictor variable. Two self-report
measures were utilized to capture this. First, participants responded to a 7-point Likert political
ideology scale (1: Very Liberal... 7: Very Conservative). They then responded to a second 7point Likert scale to report the extent to which they identified as a Republican or Democrat (1:
Democrat... 7: Republican). Thus, higher scores on this scale indicated a higher level of
conservatism (conservatives), while a lower score indicated a lower level of conservatism
(liberals).
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Memory for Policy Attribution. The main outcome variable of interest was memory for
policy attribution. For this memory task, all political policies were presented, unattributed. On a
7-point Likert scale, participants recalled which political party each policy was attributed to, and
how confident they were in their assertion (1: Completely Confident Republican... 7: Completely
Confident Democrat). Mean scores were calculated for both blocks of policies. Higher scores
indicate more confidence that the policies in the block were attributed to the Democrats, and
lower scores indicate more confidence the policies in the block were attributed to the
Republicans. This provided a mean memory for policy attribution score for policies that were
attributed to Republicans, and another for policies that were attributed to Democrats.
Attributed Policy Liking. Attributed policy liking was a secondary outcome variable of
interest. This was measured in the same fashion as the true liking score, but this time with
knowledge of which party each policy had been randomly attributed to. Specifically, on a 7-point
Likert scale, participants indicated how much they liked the policies now the policies were
attributed to either the Democrats or Republicans (1: Very good... 7: Very Bad). Mean scores
were calculated for both blocks of policies, with reverse scoring so higher scores indicated
greater liking of the policies. This provided a mean attributed policy liking score for policies that
were attributed to Republicans, and another for policies that were attributed to Democrats.
Results
Prior to testing the hypotheses, I computed the means and standard deviations for the true
liking, attributed policy liking, and memory for policy attribution variables. The liking for
policies attributed to the Democrats and Republicans was quite similar. The mean true liking for
policies that would be attributed to the Democrats was M = 5.18 (SD = .78), and for to-be
Republican attributed policies the mean was M = 5.18 (SD = .71). The attributed policy liking for
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policies was also quite similar; for Democrat attributed policies, M = 5.30 (SD = .93) and for
Republican attributed policies, M = 5.29 (SD = .89). As for memory for policy attribution, the
findings suggest that people tended to be accurate in their memories. For policies that were
attributed to the Democrats the mean was M = 5.89 (SD = 1.12), and for Republican attributed
policies the mean was M = 2.28 (SD = .89). Thus, people tended to remember that Democrat
attributed policies were attributed to the Democrats and that Republican attributed policies were
attributed to the Republicans (and were quite confident in their memories).
Multiple regression analyses were conducted to test the hypotheses. Separate analyses
were conducted for the Republican and Democrat attributed policies to ensure there were no
differences in effects for liberals and conservatives. If liberals tended to show the expected effect
and conservatives did not, or vice versa, I wanted to be able to capture that. All variables were
transformed into z-scores prior to analysis, and all relevant figures display the variables as zscores. In all figures, political ideology is represented as scores +1 standard deviation or greater
(conservatives) or -1 standard deviation or lower (liberals) on the political ideology scale. This
was done to simplify the figures and allow the reader to view the figures with clear political
party separations. In the regression models however, it was still treated as a continuous variable.
The focus of this project revolved around the novel memory for policy attribution
measure. Memory for policy attribution was regressed on political ideology, true liking, and the
interaction between them. For the Democrat attributed policies, the regression model was
statistically significant (R² = .073, F(3, 154) = 4.049, p < .05). Neither true liking nor political
ideology were significant predictors of the variance observed in memory for policy attribution.
The interaction between the two, however, was significant. The results are displayed in Table 1.
Figure 2 shows that participants tended to be more confident policies they initially liked (true
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liking) were attributed to their preferred party, and they were also more confident policies they
initially disliked were attributed to the opposing party. Those high in conservatism tended to
remember initially liked policies were attributed to the Republicans, and initially disliked
policies were attributed to the Democrats. The inverse was observed for those lower in
conservatism (liberals).
Table 1
Memory for Policy Attribution Regressed on True Liking and Political Ideology - Democrat
Estimate

Std. Error

t

Intercept

-.090

.082

-1.101

True Liking

.023

.083

.273

Political Ideology

-.077

.084

-.922

True Liking X
Political Ideology

-.257

.074

-3.451*

All variables transformed and analyzed as z-scores.
* p < .05
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Figure 2
Memory for Policy Attribution - Democrat Attributed Policies

Conservative

Liberal

Greater Confidence
Democrat Attributed

Greater Confidence
Republican Attributed

Low True
Liking

High True
Liking

Note. All variables are displayed as z-score transformations. Political ideology ratings are 1 standard deviation
above and below the mean on the political ideology measure (Conservative = +1SD; Liberal = -1SD). Higher
scores on the y-axis indicate more confidence the policy was attributed to the Democrats, while lower scores
indicate more confidence the policy was attributed to the Republicans. Higher scores on the x-axis indicate
higher levels of true liking for policies, while lower scores indicate lower liking.

As for the Republican attributed policies, similar findings were observed. The regression
model was not significant (R² = .047, F(3, 154) = 2.546, p = .058). Although the model was not
significant, the significance observed with the Democratic attributed policies and the similarity
of the results suggest these findings are important to consider as well. Again, neither political
ideology nor true liking were significant predictors of the variance observed in memory for
policy attribution. The interaction between the two, however, was. The results are displayed in
Table 2. The plot of this interaction is provided in Figure 3. Again, those high in conservatism
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tended to remember policies they initially liked as being attributed to Republicans, and policies
they disliked as coming from the Democrats. The inverse effect was observed for those low in
conservatism.
Table 2
Memory for Policy Attribution Regressed on True Liking and Political Ideology - Republican
Estimate

Std. Error

t

Intercept

.069

.083

-.825

True Liking

.094

.084

1.114

Political Ideology

-.029

.085

-341

True Liking X
Political Ideology

-196

.081

-2.415*

All variables transformed and analyzed as z-scores.
* p < .05
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Figure 3
Memory for Policy Attribution - Republican Attributed Policies

Conservative

Liberal

Greater Confidence
Democrat Attributed

Greater Confidence
Republican Attributed

Low True
Liking

High True
Liking

Note. All variables are displayed as z-score transformations. Political ideology ratings are 1 standard deviation
above and below the mean on the political ideology measure (Conservative = +1SD; Liberal = -1SD). Higher
scores on the y-axis indicate more confidence the policy was attributed to the Democrats, while lower scores
indicate more confidence the policy was attributed to the Republicans. Higher scores on the x-axis indicate
higher levels of true liking for policies, while lower scores indicate lower liking.

Hypothesis 2 was tested in a similar fashion to Hypothesis 1, only using attributed policy
liking as the outcome variable. Analyses were split between the Republican and Democratic
attributed policies. For both, attributed policy liking was regressed on political ideology, true
liking, and the interaction between them. For the Democrat attributed policies, the regression
model was significant (R² = .586, F(3, 154) = 72.53, p < .05). True liking and political ideology
were both significant predictors, but their interaction was not. Findings are displayed in Table 3.
The plot for this relationship is presented in Figure 4. This plot shows that those low in
conservatism (liberals) tended to increase their liking of policies when they were attributed to the
18

Democrats, while those high in conservatism tended to decrease their liking of policies when
they were attributed to the Democrats.
Table 3
Democrat Attributed Policy Liking Regressed on True Liking and Political Ideology
Estimate

Std. Error

t

Intercept

-.024

.055

-.443

True Liking

.563

.056

10.117*

Political Ideology

-.371

.056

-6.634*

True Liking X
Political Ideology

-.069

.050

-1.389

All variables transformed and analyzed as z-scores.
* p < .05
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Figure 4
Attributed Policy Liking - Democrat Attributed Policies

Conservative

Liberal

High Attributed
Liking

Low Attributed
Liking

Low True
Liking

High True
Liking

Note. All variables are displayed as z-score transformations. Political ideology ratings are 1 standard deviation
above and below the mean on the political ideology measure (Conservative = +1SD; Liberal = -1SD). Higher
scores on the y-axis indicate greater liking for the Democrat attributed policies; lower scores indicate lower
liking. Higher scores on the x-axis indicate increased liking for non-attributed policies; lowers scores indicate
decreased liking.

A similar effect was observed for the Republican attributed policies as well. The
regression model was significant (R² = .335, F(3, 153) = 25.64, p < .05). Both true liking and
political ideology were found to be significant predictors of attributed policy liking, while the
interaction between them was not. The findings are presented in Table 4 below. Figure 5 displays
a plot of the relationship. The plot is quite similar to Figure 4. Those high in conservatism tended
to increase their liking for policies attributed to Republicans, while those with lower
conservatism tended to decrease their liking.
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Table 4
Republican Attributed Policy Liking Regressed on True Liking and Political Ideology
Estimate

Std. Error

t

Intercept

-.050

.070

-.708

True Liking

.550

.070

7.815*

Political Ideology

.398

.071

5.609*

True Liking X
Political Ideology

-.132

.068

-1.944

All variables transformed and analyzed as z-scores.
* p < .05

Figure 5
Attributed Policy Liking - Republican Attributed Policies

Conservative

Liberal

High Attributed
Liking

Low Attributed
Liking

Low True
Liking

High True
Liking

Note. All variables are displayed as z-score transformations. Political ideology ratings are 1 standard deviation
above and below the mean on the political ideology measure (Conservative = +1SD; Liberal = -1SD). Higher
scores on the y-axis indicate greater liking for the Republican attributed policies; lower scores indicate lower
liking. Higher scores on the x-axis indicate increased liking for non-attributed policies; lowers scores indicate
decreased liking.
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Discussion
Both hypotheses were supported by the first study. First, participants tended to be more
confident that liked policies came from their own party, while being more confident that disliked
policies came from the opposing party. This is an important extension of the existing motivated
reasoning literature as it highlights a potential connection to existing memory literature.
Although the effect observed is rather small, this tendency to recall liked information as coming
from the ingroup, and disliked information as coming from the outgroup may contribute to the
political divide observed today. If people tend to recall information they like as having come
from their own party and disliked information as coming from the opposing party, it could
potentially lead to greater strife and divide. After all, why should I work with the party that never
develops policies I like? I also expect this effect would increase if the time between attribution
and recall is increased. Recall that the memory task was separated from random attribution by
mere minutes, and still an effect was observed. Kleider et al. (2008) support the idea that
increasing the separation between random attribution and the memory task will bolster the effect.
This was investigated in the second study.
The remaining findings are quite consistent with existing motivated reasoning literature
and support the second hypothesis. Participants tended to increase liking for policies when
attributed to their own party and increase disliking when they were attributed to the opposing
party. A novel finding is that true liking was a predictor of attributed policy liking. This means
that if somebody liked (disliked) a policy initially, they still tended to like (dislike) it when it was
attributed to a party. However, this liking and disliking is either amplified or diminished
depending on attribution. So, if a liberal participant liked a policy initially, and then it was
attributed to the Republicans, they may still like it, but to a lesser extent. If that liked policy was

22

attributed to the Democrats, they would probably like it to an even greater extent. This finding
shed more light on the motivated reasoning process and suggests that initial evaluations of
information are not completely erased by motivated reasoning. Motivated reasoning effects are
none-the-less significant.
Together, both findings seem to lead to a similar conclusion; people tend to refuse to
believe the opposing party can have good ideas and assume that their own party only has good
ideas. This seems to be consistent with existing social identity theory literature, which suggests

outgroup and their ideas are inherently negative (Everett et al., 2014; Hewstone et al., 2002). In
other words, both variables seem to be tied to social identity to some extent, in which
ingroup/outgroup identification influences liking and memory. This opens the door to potential
moderating variables related to social identity, such as identity fusion (Swann et al., 2012) and
social identity investment (Leach et al., 2008). These potential moderating variables, as well as
political sophistication, an established moderating variable in motivated reasoning research
(Taber & Lodge, 2006), will be investigated in the second study.
Rationale for Second Study
There were a few limitations of the first study that needed to be addressed. This second
preregistered study was designed to address these limitations, while also replicating and
extending the findings of the initial project. The first limitation to address is the delay between
random policy attribution and the memory task. As mentioned in the discussion, this memory
task was mere minutes from the random attribution. In the second study, the random policy
attribution was moved to the first part of the project, leaving the memory task in the second part
of the experiment. This changed increased the time delay between random attribution of policies
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and recall of attribution. I expected this increased delay might amplify the memory effect
observed during recall based on Kleider et al. (2008). I believe this change to a longer recall
delay also focuses the project on the memory for policy attribution effect, which is the main
outcome variable of interest. Moving the random policy attribution measure to the first part of
the project also allows for a test of Hypothesis 2, that people will have increased liking for
ingroup attributed policies and increased disliking for policies attributed to the opposing party,
with a larger sample size. Rather than only being able to test this hypothesis with the participants
that returned for the second part of the project, I was now able to analyze all participants who
completed the first part of the questionnaire.
The between session delay was also decreased in time. In the first study, participants had
48-72 hours to return to the second part of the project. There was a rather large proportion of
participants who did not return for the second part of the first study. To increase the number of
participants retained, participants were asked to return for the second part of the project 24-48
hours after completing the first. This seemed to be successful, as retention for the second study
was approximately 79.4%.
A final limitation of the first study was that there was no way to determine the actual
neutrality of the policies used as stimuli. In fact, some could be construed as not neutral at all
with recent political developments (e.g., provide congressional representation for the District of
Columbia). To address this issue, I conducted a pilot study involving a much larger policy list
(30) to empirically select policies to use as stimuli in the second study.
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Pilot Study Policy Neutrality
The following study was conducted to find, out of 30 total, 12 relatively neutral
hypothetical political policies that could be used in the second study. The main goal was to select
policies to create 2 blocks of policies that were comparably neutral.
Method
Participants
The sample was comprised of undergraduate students enrolled at Western Kentucky
University. All participants received partial course credit for participation. The final sample
consisted of 140 participants (101 female; 37 male; 2 non-binary or other). 21 participants were
excluded because they either indicated their data should be excluded from the study, or their
responses seemed implausible (e.g., indicating they were completely confident all policies were
from the Democrats). These exclusions were made before examining the policy neutrality data.
Design
The pilot study was a simple survey. All 30 political policies were presented to all
participants, and they indicated which party they believed would support each policy.
Procedure
The questionnaire was entirely online, created using the questionnaire design service
Qualtrics. It was administered to participants via the online research participation tool for
psychological studies at Western Kentucky University (Study Board).
Prior to the study, 18 new hypothetical political policies were created. These were
combined with the 12 political policies from the initial study to create a complete list of 30
hypothetical political policies. The complete list of policies can be found in Appendix B. All
were designed with the hope to be somewhat politically neutral, and polarized topics such as
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abortion or gun policy were avoided. For the study, participants saw each political policy in a
random order, unattributed to either political party. For each, they indicated to what extent they
believed the policy to be either Democrat or Republican proposed.
Measures
Policy Neutrality. For each policy, participants indicated the extent they believed the
policy was proposed by either the Democrat or Republican party. Participants did this on a 7point Likert Scale (1: Completely Confident Democra

7:

Completely Confident Republican).
Results
The mean, median, and standard deviation for each policy was calculated for each policy.
Policies were selected so that blocks would be similarly neutral, with overall block means similar
to each other. The policies that were selected had a mean and median as close to 4 as possible, as
well as the smallest possible standard deviation. Tables 5 and 6 display the characteristics of
each block.
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Table 5
Policies and Characteristics of Block 1
Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Policy to offer tax breaks to families that adopt children.

3.87

4

1.29

Policy to develop polymer-fiber railroad cars to lower the
cost of cross-country transportation.

3.82

4

1.19

Policy to require all-wheel anti-lock brakes on new vehicles.

3.9

4

1.00

Policy to divert United States Agriculture loan programs
from natural disaster management to cover crop fundings.

4.48

5

1.10

Policy to create new hybrids of gasoline that improve gas
mileage but allow a higher profit margin.

4.14

4

1.32

Policy to allow tech companies access to private information
during police investigations to better assist authorities.

4.33

4

1.23

Block Mean

4.09

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Policy to decrease the amount of funding provided to
students through federally funded college loan programs.

4.38

5

1.59

Policy to develop a high-speed train system across the U.S.

4.06

4

1.23

Policy to allow search engines increased access to personal
information for advertising purposes.

3.92

4

1.25

Policy to subsidize American steel for infrastructure.

4.73

4

1.06

Policy to abolish daylight savings time nationally.

3.92

4

1.18

Policy to provide liability release to companies that donate
food to food pantries.

3.76

4

1.18

Table 6
Policies and Characteristics of Block 2

Block Mean
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4.13

Discussion
After completing this pilot study, two blocks of hypothetical political policies were
created. These policies were viewed as mostly neutral among an undergraduate sample, and the
blocks themselves are comparably neutral. These policy blocks were used in the second study.
Study 2
The second study was preregistered and designed to address the described limitations of
the first. It was similar to the first, with some methodological improvements to address the noted
limitations. Several moderating variables were also investigated: political sophistication, identity
fusion, and social identity investment. Each one of these is discussed below.
Moderating Variables
Political Sophistication
The first moderating variable of interest was political sophistication, operationalized as a
general knowledge of U.S. politics. Political sophistication is a well-documented moderating
variable in motivated reasoning. It has been demonstrated that those higher in political
sophistication were more likely to identify President Barack Obama correctly as a Christian, both
liberals and conservatives, compared to those low in sophistication (Hartman & Newmark,
2012). Similarly, those high in sophistication have been shown to discount conspiracy theories if
the conspiracies were incongruent with their ideological beliefs (Miller et al., 2016). These
findings suggest politically sophisticated people are more able to parse through what is true, and
what is not, when it comes to political information.
Political sophistication, however, also affects reasoning in ways that may not be
expected. Conservatives high in political sophistication were more likely to endorse a conspiracy
theory that was congruent with their political ideology compared to conservatives low in
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sophistication (Miller et al., 2016). Similarly, Taber and Lodge (2006) found those high in
political sophistication had increased tendencies to rate belief-confirming arguments as stronger
than belief-challenging arguments. They also found high sophisticates tended to seek out
arguments supporting their existing beliefs but spent more time processing belief-challenging
arguments

consistent with a desire to counterargue. These findings suggest those high in

sophistication do not necessarily use their knowledge to make accurate conclusions. Rather, they
may use it to make conclusions that are consistent with their existing beliefs.
The second study used an adapted version of political sophistication based on the work of
Miller et al. (2016). Miller and colleagues developed an 11-item quiz on general political
knowledge, which was updated for the present-day political landscape to be used in this project.
Greater performance on the quiz indicated greater political sophistication. I hypothesized that as
political sophistication increased, participants would be more likely to remember liked policies
as coming from their own party, and disliked policies as coming from the opposing party, based
on the notion that those high in political sophistication would be able to justify their memory task
assertions more fluently.
Partisan Identity Fusion
Another variable of interest was identity fusion. Identity fusion indicates the extent a

individual begins seeing their group, and its other members (even those they have not met), as an
extension of themselves. They still, however, retain personal agency, meaning their actions are
driven by their own desires, not necessarily the desires of the group (Swann et al., 2012). Highly
fused individuals are thus more likely to act in ways to protect the group or assist the group and
its members, almost as if they were protecting themselves (Swann & Buhrmester, 2015; Swann
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et al., 2012). Existing identity fusion research has shown that those high in fusion are more likely
to participate in monetary giving to ingroup members (Purzycki & Lang, 2019), including
political ingroup members (Misch et al., 2018). Other research has shown more extreme behavior
from those high in identity fusion. In a review of literature, Swann and Buhrmester (2015) found
those high in fusion were more likely to endorse dying for their group. Another review found
those high-fused people were more likely to overlook ethical transgressions of their ingroup and
endorse violence towards outgroups perceived as dangerous (Henríquez et al., 2020).
A review of relevant research has not revealed a connection between identity fusion and
motivated reasoning. However, the findings from my first study are possibly related to social
identity to some extent, which suggests the possible relevance of identity fusion. It follows from
the construct of identity fusion that those high in fusion may be more susceptible to motivated
reasoning, as they have a deeper connection with their group and may be more motivated to
come to conclusions that support the group and/or their existing political beliefs.
In the second study, I utilized a 7-item identity fusion scale developed by Gómez et al.
(2011), with slight alterations to transform it into a political identity fusion scale. I hypothesized
high identity fusion scores (relative to lower scores) would be associated with increased
confidence that a liked policy came from the ingroup party, and increased confidence that a
disliked policy came from the outgroup.
Social Identity Investment
A final variable of interest was social identity investment. I have already posed the idea
that the findings from my first study may be related to social identity in some capacity. Social
identity, however, is quite a broad concept. Leach et al. (2008) argued that social identity could
be divided into two components, group self-definition and self-investment, which themselves
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include sub-components. Self-definition includes centrality, self-stereotyping, and ingroup
homogeneity. Cent

-

concept. Self-stereotyping refers to the extent a person identifies themselves as similar to other
ingroup members. Ingroup homogeneity refers to the extent a person believes all members in a
group share common traits (Leach et al., 2008). Self-investment includes items measuring
solidarity and satisfaction. Solidarity refers to the commitment and psychological bond an
individual has with the group. Satisfaction refers to how happy a person is with their group
(Leach et al., 2008).
Research has provided evidence that ingroup self-definition and self-investment can
affect behavior in unique ways. For example, one article has shown that people tend to share
more ingroup norms regarding climate change when they report higher self-investment with the
group, but the construct of self-definition was not found to be related to changes in climate
change beliefs (Masson & Fritsche, 2014). Similarly, another project found that those with high
ingroup self-investment were more likely to perceive news articles as biased against their group,
while self-definition was not related (Hartmann & Tanis, 2013).
These results suggest that ingroup self-investment may, in particular, lead a person to be
more supportive of the ingroup and its norms. It might be that a person who is invested in their
ingroup may be more motivated to believe the ingroup has good ideas. After all, why would they
be invested in a group that develops negative ideas? Thus, I expected ingroup self-investment,
but not ingroup self-definition, would act as a moderating variable to memory for policy
attribution. Specifically, I expected those higher in self-investment will be more confident
policies they liked came from their own party, and more confident disliked policies came from
the outgroup party. Although the hypothesis only pertains to self-investment, the entire scale
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developed by Leach et al. (2008) was included in the questionnaire for potential exploratory
analysis in the future.
Method
Participants
The sample was comprised of undergraduate students enrolled at Western Kentucky
University. All participants received partial course credit for participation. The final sample
consisted of 272 participants (212 female, 56 male, 2 non-binary or other) who completed the
first part of the study. The mean age of the sample was approximately M = 19.9 years old (SD =
2.98). This sample was majority liberal. The distribution of political ideology for the sample is
presented in figure 6. Of these 272 participants, 216 (79.4%) returned for the second part of the
project. At the end of the questionnaire, participants were told that it was vital to obtain data
from individuals paying attention to the project, and they were asked if their data should be
included. Fifty-six participants were excluded because they either indicated their data should be
excluded from the study, or their responses seemed implausible (e.g., indicating they were
completely confident all policies were from the Democrats). This resulted in a final sample of
216 total participants, 151 of which returned for the second part of the study.
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Figure 6
Distribution of Political Ideology in Study 2

Design
The second study was again a two-part, within-subjects design. There were 3 predictor
variables, two of which were measured (true liking of political policies and political ideology)
and one that was manipulated (random attribution of policies to the Democrat or Republican
party). For this manipulated variable, randomization was counterbalanced. Policies were
randomly assigned to two blocks prior to the study (6 policies to each block). Within the study,
one policy block was randomly assigned to one of the parities, and the other to the other party,
separately for each participant. There were two outcome variables, attributed policy liking and
memory for policy attribution. There were also 3 moderator variables, all of which were
measured: political sophistication, identity fusion, and social identity investment.
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Procedure
To administer the study, I designed a questionnaire using the online questionnaire design
service Qualtrics. This questionnaire was administered to the participants via Study Board, the
online research participation tool for psychological studies at Western Kentucky University. The
researchers did not have any personal contact with participants, and the entire procedure was
carried out online.
The questionnaire had two parts. In part one, participants were presented with 12
hypothetical political policies. These were the policies developed from the policy neutrality pilot
study. One of the policies from the first block of policies did not transfer correctly into Qualtrics
(policy to create new hybrids of gasoline that improve gas mileage but allow a higher profit
margin). This unfortunately made the data involving this policy unusable, and it was removed
prior to analysis. The new mean for policy block 1 was only slightly affected (mean went from
4.09 to 4.08). This suggests it was still comparable to block 2. Thus, block 1 was used with one
less policy than block 2. The full list of the political policies can be found in Appendix C.
Participants indicated their liking for each of these policies, which were unattributed at
the time. As in study 1, this liking measure will be referred to as true liking. They then
completed a distractor task. Following the distractor task, participants saw the policies again.
Policies were presented in the two predetermined blocks, in counterbalanced order, with one
block randomly attributed to the Republican party, and the other block attributed to the Democrat
party as described in the design. Respondents indicated their liking of the attributed policies.
This liking measure is referred to as attributed policy liking. Participants then responded to items
that indicated their political ideology and political identity fusion.
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Twenty-four to forty-eight hours later, participants returned for the second part of the
questionnaire. Participants saw all 11 policies again in the context of memory task. For each
policy, participants indicated how confident they were that either party had supposedly proposed
the policy. This memory measure served as the memory for policy attribution variable. Next,
participants indicated their level of social identity investment and identification. Finally,
participants self-reported their general knowledge of politics and then took an 11-item quiz about
general political topics (political sophistication).
Measures
True Liking. True liking of policies was a predictor variable. All 11 political policies
were presented to participants in part one of the study, unattributed to either party at the time.
Participants indicated their liking of each policy by responding to a 7-point Likert scale (1:
Extremely Oppose...7: Extremely Support). A mean score was calculated for both blocks of
policies. This provided a mean true liking score for policies that would, in the next part of the
study, be attributed to Republicans and another for policies that would be attributed to
Democrats.
Political Ideology. Political ideology was the second predictor variable. Two self-report
measures were utilized to capture this. First, participants responded to a 7-point Likert political
ideology scale (1: Very Liberal... 7: Very Conservative). They then responded to a second 7point Likert scale to report the extent to which they identified as a Republican or Democrat (1:
Democrat... 7: Republican). Political ideology was calculated by aggregating these two scales
together. Thus, higher scores on this scale indicated a higher level of conservatism
(conservatives), while a lower score indicated a lower level of conservatism (liberals).
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Memory for Policy Attribution. The main outcome variable of interest was memory for
policy attribution. For this memory task, all political policies were presented again, unattributed.
On a 7-point Likert scale, participants recalled which political party each policy was attributed
to, and how confident they were in their assertion (1: Completely Confident Republican... 7:
Completely Confident Democrat). Mean scores were calculated for both blocks of policies. Thus,
higher scores indicate more confidence the policies in the block were attributed to the
Democrats, and lower scores indicate more confidence the policies in the block were attributed
to the Republicans. This provided a mean memory for policy attribution score for policies that
were attributed to Republicans, and another for policies that were attributed to Democrats.
Attributed Policy Liking. Attributed policy liking was a secondary outcome variable of
interest. This was measured in the same fashion as the true liking score, but this time with
knowledge of which party each policy had been randomly attributed to. Specifically, on a 7-point
Likert scale, participants indicated how much they liked the policies now the policies were
attributed to either the Democrats or Republicans (1: Extremely Support... 7: Extremely Oppose).
Mean scores were calculated for both blocks of policies and were reverse scored so that higher
values indicated greater support. This provided a mean attributed policy liking score for policies
that were attributed to Republicans, and another for policies that were attributed to Democrats.
Political Sophistication. An adapted 11-item quiz of general political knowledge used in
existing political sophistication research (Miller et al., 2016) was used to measure political
sophistication. This short quiz included items
Essentially,
this quiz measures general knowledge of politics, which is what political sophistication has been
operationalized as. Each item was multiple choice and included a response in which a participant
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could indicate they did not know the answer. The sum of the correct answers quiz was calculated
and used as the political sophistication score. Possible scores ranged from 0 to 11, with higher
scores indicating greater political sophistication (general knowledge), while lower scores
indicated lower political sophistication.
Identity Fusion. Identity fusion was measured using the 7-item identity fusion scale
developed by Gómez et al. (2011), adapted to measure political identity fusion. The items are
various statements, and participants respond by indicating the extent they agree with each
statement on a 7-point Likert Scale (

). Sample items
The mean of the scale is

taken as the final identity fusion score. The scale has been validated by Gómez et al. (2011) and
has strong test-retest and split-half reliability. They also showed that all items loaded onto a
single factor, and they were able to differentiate identity fusion from ingroup identification.
Social Identity Investment. Social identity investment was measured using the 14-item
social identity scale developed by Leach et al. (2008). This scale of social identity differentiates
social identity definition and social identity investment. 10 items measure investment and the
other 4 measure definition. I expected a moderating effect for social identity investment alone
but included the entire scale to explore social identity definition in the future. Participants
indicated their level of agreement with various statements (
Agree). The mean for the investment sub-scale was calculated. An example of an investment

Results
Prior to testing the hypotheses, I computed the means and standard deviations for the true
liking, attributed policy liking, and memory for policy attribution variables. The liking for
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policies attributed to the Democrats and Republicans were quite comparable. The mean true
liking for policies that would be attributed to the Democrats was M = 4.16 (SD = .75), and for tobe Republican attributed policies the mean was M = 4.11 (SD = .77). The attributed policy liking
for policies were also quite similar; for Democrat attributed policies, M = 4.20 (SD = .86) and for
Republican attributed policies, M = 4.15 (SD = .86). Memory for policy attribution showed that
people were tended to be accurate in their memories of which party the policies were attributed
to, but not very confident in their memories. The mean for policies attributed to the Democrats
was M = 4.65 (SD = .87), while for Republican attributed policies M = 3.36 (SD = 1.01). This
suggests that participants still tended to be correct in memories, but compared to the first study,
they were less confident in their memories.
Multiple regression analyses were conducted to test all hypotheses. Again, outcomes
were analyzed separately for the Republican and Democrat attributed policies. All variables were
transformed into z-scores prior to analysis, and all relevant figures display the variables as zscores. In all figures, political ideology is represented as scores +1 standard deviation or greater
(conservatives) or -1 standard deviation or lower (liberals) on the political ideology scale. This
was done to simplify the figures and allow the reader to view the figures with clear political
party separations. In the regression models however, it was still treated as a continuous variable.
First, I will discuss the findings for the main outcome of interest, memory for policy
attribution. Memory for policy attribution was regressed on political ideology, true liking, and
their interaction. For the Democrat attributed policies, the regression model was significant (R² =
.061, F(3, 148) = 4.049, p < .05). Neither true liking nor political ideology were significant
predictors of the variance observed in memory for policy attribution, but their interaction was.
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The results are displayed in Table 7. Figure 7 displays the observed interaction, showing that
participants tended to remember policies they initially liked as coming from their preferred party.
Table 7
Memory for Policy Attribution Regressed on True Liking and Political Ideology - Democrat
Estimate

Std. Error

t

Intercept

.076

.081

.947

True Liking

.007

.075

.087

Political Ideology

-.134

.076

-1.760

True Liking X
Political Ideology

-.169

.068

-2.480*

All variables transformed and analyzed as z-scores.
* p < .05
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Figure 7
Memory for Policy Attribution - Democrat Attributed Policies

Conservative

Liberal

Greater Confidence
Democrat Attributed

Greater Confidence
Republican Attributed

Low True
Liking

High True
Liking

Note. All variables are displayed as z-score transformations. Political ideology ratings are 1 standard deviation
above and below the mean on the political ideology measure (Conservative = +1SD; Liberal = -1SD). Higher
scores on the y-axis indicate more confidence the policy was attributed to the Democrats, while lower scores
indicate more confidence the policy was attributed to the Republicans. Higher scores on the x-axis indicate
higher levels of true liking for policies, while lower scores indicate lower liking.

As for the Republican attributed policies, findings were null. The regression model was
nonsignificant (R² = .009, F(3, 148) = .442, p = .723). No variables in the model were significant
predictors. The closest was ideology, which had a p = .405. A plot of the data is presented in
Figure 8, which shows conservatives and liberals were quite similar in their memory scores.
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Figure 8
Memory for Policy Attribution - Republican Attributed Policies
Conservative

Liberal

More Confidence
Democrat Attributed

More Confidence
Republican Attributed

Low True
Liking

High True
Liking

Note. All variables are displayed as z-score transformations. Political ideology ratings are 1 standard deviation
above and below the mean on the political ideology measure (Conservative = +1SD; Liberal = -1SD). Higher
scores on the y-axis indicate more confidence the policy was attributed to the Democrats, while lower scores
indicate more confidence the policy was attributed to the Republicans. Higher scores on the x-axis indicate
higher levels of true liking for policies, while lower scores indicate lower liking.

Next, I will discuss the findings for Hypothesis 2. This hypothesis was tested in a similar
fashion, except the outcome variable was changed to attributed policy liking. Attributed policy
liking was regressed on political ideology, true liking, and their interaction. For the Democrat
attributed policies, the regression model was significant (R² = .427, F(3, 212) = 52.69, p < .05).
True liking and political ideology were both significant predictors, but their interaction was not.
Findings are displayed in Table 8, and the relationship is plotted in Figure 9. This plot shows that
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those low in conservatism tend to have higher attributed policy liking scores than those high in
conservatism. It also shows that true liking is a strong predictor of attributed policy liking.
Table 8
Democrat Attributed Policy Liking Regressed on True Liking and Political Ideology
Estimate

Std. Error

t

Intercept

-.013

.053

.248

True Liking

.635

.052

12.175*

Political Ideology

-.163

.053

-3.060*

True Liking X
Political Ideology

.044

.049

.905

All variables transformed and analyzed as z-scores.
* p < .05
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Figure 9
Attributed Policy Liking Democrat Attributed Policies
Conservative

Liberal

High Attributed
Liking

Low Attributed
Liking

Low True
Liking

High True
Liking

Note. All variables are displayed as z-score transformations. Political ideology ratings are 1 standard deviation
above and below the mean on the political ideology measure (Conservative = +1SD; Liberal = -1SD). Higher
scores on the y-axis indicate greater liking for the Democrat attributed policies; lower scores indicate lower
liking. Higher scores on the x-axis indicate increased liking for non-attributed policies; lowers scores indicate
decreased liking.

A similar effect was observed for the Republican attributed policies. The regression
model was significant (R² = .446, F(3, 212) = 56.97, p < .05). Both true liking and political
ideology were significant predictors of attributed policy liking, while the interaction between
them was not significant. The findings are presented in Table 9, and Figure 10 displays a plot of
the effects. This plot shows that those high in conservatism tended to increase liking for the
Republican attributed policies compared to liberal counterparts. Still, true liking was a strong
significant predictor of attributed policy liking too.
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Table 9
Republican Attributed Policy Liking Regressed on True Liking and Political Ideology
Estimate

Std. Error

t

Intercept

-.016

.051

-.316

True Liking

.604

.052

11.547*

Political Ideology

.323

.051

6.378*

True Liking X
Political Ideology

.017

.052

.342

All variables transformed and analyzed as z-scores.
* p < .05

Figure 10
Attributed Policy Liking

Republican Attributed Policies
Conservative

Liberal

High Attributed
Liking

Low Attributed
Liking

Low True
Liking

High True
Liking

Note. All variables are displayed as z-score transformations. Political ideology ratings are 1 standard deviation
above and below the mean on the political ideology measure (Conservative = +1SD; Liberal = -1SD). Higher
scores on the y-axis indicate greater liking for the Republican attributed policies; lower scores indicate lower
liking. Higher scores on the x-axis indicate increased liking for non-attributed policies; lowers scores indicate
decreased liking.
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For the moderation hypotheses, the general model for all analyses was memory for policy
attribution regressed on true liking, ideology, the moderator variable, and all higher-order
interactions between the variables. All variables, including the moderated variables, were
transformed into z-scores prior to analysis. Identity fusion and social identity investment failed to
produce significant moderation effects. Models failed to reach significance, and no main effects
or interactions were detected for either identity fusion or social identity investment. Political
sophistication did, however, produce some significant results.
When investigating sophistication, the regression model for the Democrat attributed
policies was significant (R² = .129, F(7, 143) = 3.021, p < .05). In this model, political ideology
( = -.217, p < .05) and the interaction between political ideology and political sophistication (
= .236, p < .05) achieved significance. The observed interaction is plotted in Figure 11. This plot
shows that those low in sophistication tend to remember policies as coming from their own party.
When people were high in sophistication, this observed effect seemed to disappear.
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Figure 11
Political Sophistication Moderation

Democrat Attributed Policies
Conservative

Liberal

Greater Confidence
Democrat Attributed

Greater Confidence
Republican Attributed

Low Political
Sophistication

High Political
Sophistication

Note. All variables are displayed as z-score transformations. Political ideology ratings are 1 standard deviation above
and below the mean on the political ideology measure (Conservative = +1SD; Liberal = -1SD). Higher scores on the
y-axis indicate more confidence the policy was attributed to the Democrats, while lower scores indicate more
confidence the policy was attributed to the Republicans. Higher scores on the x-axis indicate higher levels of political
sophistication, while lower scores indicate lower political sophistication.

The moderation of sophistication did not replicate for the policies that were attributed to
the Republican party. The regression model was non-significant (R² = .062, F(7, 143) = 3.021, p
= .23). In Figure 12, the interaction between ideology and political sophistication is plotted,
showing the lack of replication compared to the policies that were attributed to the Democrats.
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Figure 12
Political Sophistication Moderation

Republican Attributed Policies
Conservative

Liberal

Greater Confidence
Democrat Attributed

Greater Confidence
Republican Attributed

Low Political
Sophistication

High Political
Sophistication

Note. All variables are displayed as z-score transformations. Political ideology ratings are 1 standard deviation above
and below the mean on the political ideology measure (Conservative = +1SD; Liberal = -1SD). Higher scores on the
y-axis indicate more confidence the policy was attributed to the Democrats, while lower scores indicate more
confidence the policy was attributed to the Republicans. Higher scores on the x-axis indicate higher levels of political
sophistication, while lower scores indicate lower political sophistication.

Discussion
The memory for policy attribution partially replicated in this second study, but only for
the policies that were attributed to the Democrats. The expected interaction between ideology
and time attitudes was observed, supporting the first hypothesis that people would tend to
remember policies they liked as being attributed to the ingroup, and policies they disliked as
being attributed to the outgroup. Further investigation showed that this effect appeared to be
especially prominent for liked policies. Disliked policies, in contrast, did not produce the same
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biased memory effect where disliked policies are remembered as being attributed to the opposing
group. As for the Republican attributed policies, no significant effects were observed. Thus, only
the results produced from the Democrat attributed policies supported the first hypothesis.
The results for the second hypothesis, which was that participants would increase their
liking for policies attributed to their own party and decrease their liking for policies attributed to
the opposing party, replicated quite well, and show support for Hypothesis 2. When the policies
were attributed to the Democrats, liberal participants tended to like the policies more than
conservatives. When policies were attributed to the Republicans, the conservatives tended to like
the policies more than liberals. Still, it is important to remember that true liking was still a
significant predictor of attributed policy liking. This means

initial attitudes toward

the policies predicted their attitudes toward the policies when they were attributed. For example,
if a liberal initially liked a policy, and then the policy was attributed to the Republicans, they
would probably still like the policy, but to a lesser extent. If the policy was attributed to the
Democrats, they would likely increase their liking of the policy.
I also hypothesized that political sophistication would moderate the memory effect
observed. Specifically, I expected those high in sophistication, compared to those low in
sophistication, would tend to be more inclined to remember policies they liked as being
attributed to their own party and policies they disliked as being attributed to the opposing party.
The moderation analysis for policies that were attributed to the Democrats did produce
significant results, however, in an unexpected direction. Those results suggested that those high
in sophistication were less likely to remember policies in ways consistent with their liking of the
policies than those low in sophistication. It appears that those high in sophistication had less
biased memories of policy attribution, contrary to my expectation.
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Although this finding for sophistication was not hypothesized, it is consistent with
findings suggesting that those high in sophistication are more accurate in political decision
making (Hartman & Newmark, 2012; Miller et al., 2016). This seems to have been the case in
this project, as those that are low in sophistication showed biases in their memory. It would be
interesting to see if those in sophistication are more accurate, or rather just more likely to
indicate less confidence in assessments. It could be the case that because the policies were not
controversial or stereotypically associated with a particular party, participants could not rely on
their existing political knowledge to assist their memory. Those high in sophistication might
have recognized this, and simply indicated they could not remember where the policy was
attributed (or at least that they were not very confident in their assertion). Those low in
sophistication, however, may have relied more on their liking in the memory task, leading to the
biased memory effect observed. Conclusions are difficult to make because the finding did not
replicate in policies attributed to the Republicans. Future research could investigate if this
finding replicates, and further parse what the cause of it is.
The other hypothesized moderation effects for identity fusion and social group were not
observed. It could be that the undergraduate sample used in this study does not provide the best
ability to test these moderating variables. Identity fusion and social group investment indicate
stronger connections and commitments to an ingroup. Undergraduate students may not be
particularly invested or fused to a group like a political party. Young undergraduates, such as
first years and sophomores, are likely only just beginning to be invested in politics. Not only
that, but college could also be a time of shifting political attitudes as people are presented with
new ideas. These factors may indicate that they do not have a strong connection to a political
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party. Perhaps a similar study conducted with a sample more solidified in their political support
and attitudes would produce expected results.
General Discussion
Collectively, the two studies offer partial support for Hypothesis 1, that people tend to
remember liked political policies as coming from the ingroup. Rather consistently, people
believed the hypothetical policies they liked were attributed to their own party. The first study
also showed that people tended to believe disliked policies were attributed to the opposing group,
but this did not replicate well in the second study. This finding may highlight a contributing
factor to political tensions in the U.S. and globally. If people tend to remember the policies they
like as coming from their ingroup party, it could potentially lead to greater liking for their own
party and greater disliking for the opposing party. This could be even stronger if people also tend
to remember disliked policies as being attributed to the opposing party. In this case, a person
would come to believe that most liked policies were from their own party and most disliked
policies were from the opposing party. If this was the case, why would they want their party to
work with the opposing party, or even listen to the opposin
the opposing party come up with is a bad idea!
Although there is evidence that supports the first hypothesis, the results for the second
study did not perfectly replicate the results of the first study. In the second study, only when they
were attributed to Democrats were liked policies remembered as being attributed to the
for the memory effect only partially replicate in this
second study? There are methodological changes to the second study that were implemented as
improvements but could have potentially affected results in an unforeseen way. However, there
is also a larger issue to consider when were the data collected?
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Data for the first study were collected in Fall 2020 and Spring 2021. This means that the
2020 U.S. presidential election, a highly politically polarizing event, took place during data
collection. This election could have potentially affected the results of the study, explaining why
there was only partial replication for the second study. There is recent evidence that suggests
elections do produce changes in individuals. For instance, one study found that for the 2016 U.S.
presidential election, identity fusion with a per

gradually increased the closer

the election came. After the election, fusion began to weaken (Misch et al., 2016). Similarly,
Edelson et al. (2017) found that all individuals were more likely to believe election fraud
conspiracy theories just preceding the 2012 presidential election. After the election, only those
whose party had lost continued their increased belief in election fraud conspiracies.
Perhaps the memory effect observed in my two studies worked in a similar fashion. Just
before and after the highly contested 2020 election, people remembered liked policies as having
come from their own party and disliked policies as having come from the opposing party.
Tensions between parties were running (perhaps historically) high. Maybe this motivated
individuals to remember policies in ways that supported their ingroup (liked policies came from
the ingroup) and oppose their outgroup (disliked policies came from the outgroup). In the data
used for the second study, which was collected in Fall 2021 and Spring 2022, political tensions
likely decreased. People could have still been motivated to support their own party, which is why
liked policies were still remembered as having been attributed to the ingroup. However, the
motivation to oppose the other party could have decreased significantly, which is why in the
second study participants did not appear to remember disliked policies as having been attributed
to the opposing party. Perhaps in some other fashion, this could explain why the memory effect
was only observed in policies attributed to the Democrats, and not for the policies attributed to
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the Republicans, in the second study. A study designed specifically to determine if this potential
cause has any merit could be quite interesting.
The two studies also strongly suggest that people tend to like policies more when they are
attributed to their own group and like them less when they are attributed to the opposing group.
When attributed to the Republicans, conservatives tended to like policies more than liberals. The
opposite was true when policies were attributed to the Democrats. This is largely consistent with
existing research that found similar increases in liking for neutral information attributed to the
ingroup (Bolsen et al., 2014; Maoz et al., 2002). Still, it was somewhat surprising how simple the
manipulation was that produced the effect. Recall that in these studies, the manipulation was
simply attributing the policies to the Democrats or Republicans; the policy itself was not altered
in any other way. This simple manipulation produced these consistent changes in liking for both
studies. If simply telling a person a random policy came from their own party increases support
for that policy, imagine what might happen if that policy was openly endorsed by leaders in their
preferred party. Not only that, but those leaders may actively try to convince their base the policy
is positive. Liking could potentially increase greatly, regardless of
the policy.
Overall, I believe these studies provide insights into political behavior and extend
existing knowledge of motivated reasoning. Of course, there were limitations of the project that
could be improved upon. First, the sample utilized was comprised of undergraduate students,
raising questions as to the generalizability of the results in a typical sample. Future research
might attempt to replicate these findings in samples that are more representative of the general
population. Although my sample is limiting, existing literature suggests these findings could be
reproducible in other samples. It has been found that older adults tend to rely on schemas in
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memory tasks more than younger adults (Mather & Johnson, 2003). As discussed in the literature
review, the observed memory effect in these studies may be connected to schematic memory. If
this is truly the case, the memory effect may be even stronger in an older, more representative
sample. Furthermore, it might be that college students are not as politically involved as the
general population. Perhaps greater political interest and involvement would bolster the effect as
well.
Another related limitation is that the samples is also not very representative of the
political landscape. The samples from both studies leaned quite heavily liberal. This was
expected in this college student sample, but still limits my ability to make conclusions. A sample
with more political ideology variety could provide interesting findings. Potentially, new findings
regarding conservatives could be found if they had more representation. This limitation could
also somehow contribute to the lack of replication in the memory effect in the second study. I
hope future studies will be able to capture a more even distributed sample and investigate
potential changes.
A final limitation is that the sample for the second study was not as large as hoped for.
The sample size goal was 250-300 participants with usable data to test for the memory effect.
Unfortunately, time constraints restricted the sample size, resulting in a final sample of 151
participants to test the memory effect (essentially the same size as the final sample of study 1,
which had 154 participants). Still, more participants (216) were available to test the attributed
policy liking effect, a significant improvement from study 1. I hope that future studies of these
effects can obtain larger samples.
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Conclusion
Despite these limitations, I believe these studies provide useful insights in at least 3 ways.
First, it highlights potential contributors to the political divide observed in the current day. Both
the memory for policy attribution and attributed policy liking effects have the potential to be
contributing forces in political division. Consistently remembering policy attribution and liking
eir feelings toward their
own party and contribute to a growth of disliking for the opposing party.
Second, it replicates and furthers existing knowledge of motivated reasoning. Not only
does it replicate existing motivated reasoning findings, but it also highlights the importance of a

be incredibly important and failing to do so could change interpretation of results. In this study, I
was able to see that initial attitudes are still predictors. Liked policies are still liked, and disliked
policies are still disliked, but the extent that they are liked or disliked is altered depending on the
party the policy was attributed to. Other literature in motivated reasoning seems to fail to
consider this.
Third, it extends motivated reasoning literature into new, exciting avenues. To the best of
my knowledge, motivated reasoning research in the context of a memory study has not been
conducted. The observed memory effect now highlights some interesting potential connections
between motivated reasoning and existing memory research. I believe researchers can explore
this relationship further and uncover potentially important connections. Overall, I believe this
project produced findings that extend existing knowledge on motivated reasoning and highlights
potential contributing factors to the political polarization seen in the modern political climate.
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Appendix A:
Study 1
Political Policy List
Block 1
1. Use camera drones to protect the border.
2. Provide liability release to companies that donate food to food pantries.
3. Subsidize American steel for infrastructure.
4. Make insurance more accessible to people with medical preconditions.
5. Provide tax breaks to companies using biodegradable materials.
6. Allocate more money toward technology in public school.
Block 2
1. Develop a high-speed train system across the U.S.
2. Provide job training and education to incarcerated individuals.
3. Make all plastics recyclable by 2030.
4. Provide congressional representation for the District of Columbia.
5. Offer tax breaks to families that adopt children.
6. Allow felons to vote upon release from prison.
Memory for Policy Attribution
Participants are presented with the list of political policies and asked what party they remember
the policy was previously attributed to. (1: Completely
Confident Democrat)
Attributed Policy Liking
Participants are presented with the list of political policies, with attribution to either the
Democrat or Republican party, and asked to indicate their liking for each policy. (1: Very
).
True Liking
Participants are presented with the list of political policies, with no party attribution, and asked to
indicate their liking for each policy. (
).
Political Ideology
1. My political ideology is: (
2. Do you consider yourself more a Democrat, or more a Republican? (
Republican)
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Appendix B:
Pilot Study Policy Neutrality
Political Policy List
1. Provide funding to city governments to replace one-third of commercial gas pumps with
electric vehicle charging stations.
2. Divert United States Department of Agriculture loan programs from natural disaster
management to cover crop funding.
3. Allow universities to sell student data for commercial purposes to lower tuition costs.
4. require all-wheel anti-lock brakes on new vehicles.
5. implement a government-run car buyback program for those interested in purchasing low
emissions vehicles.
6. increase funding to disaster relief institutions in the United States.
7. develop smaller, less-observable, surveillance drones to be used in investigating
suspected criminal activity in the U.S.
8. reorganize primary school breaks to maximize overlap between student breaks and time
taken off by parents to allow more family vacations.
9. introduce syringe lock-boxes around communities for safe syringe disposal for
recreational drug users to reduce community spread of hepatitis.
10. develop polymer-fiber railroad cars to lower the cost of cross-country transportation.
11. create new hybrids of gasoline that improve gas mileage but allow a higher profit margin.
12. require all vehicle manufacturing companies to only manufacture vehicles that exceed 35
miles per gallon by 2028.
13. allow search engines increased access to personal information for advertising purposes.
14. allow tech companies access to private information during police investigations to better
assist authorities.
15. abolish daylight savings time nationally.
16. decrease the amount of funding provided to students through federally-funded college
loan programs.
17. implement term limits for the members of the U.S. House of Representatives.
18. increase the size of Native American reservations.
19. provide liability release to companies that donate food to food pantries.
20. make insurance more accessible to people with medical preconditions.
21. use camera drones to protect the border.
22. allocate more money toward technology in public schools.
23. provide tax breaks to companies using biodegradable materials.
24. develop a high-speed train system across the U.S.
25. provide job training and education to incarcerated individuals.
26. make all plastics recyclable by 2030.
27. provide congressional representation for the District of Columbia.
28. offer tax breaks to families that adopt children.
29. allow felons to vote upon release from prison.
30. subsidize American steel for infrastructure.
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Policy Neutrality
Participants were presented with all 30 hypothetical political policies, and indicated to what
extent which party they believed the policy came from on a 7-point Likert scale (1: Completely
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Appendix C:
Study 2
Political Policy List
Block 1
1. Offer tax breaks to families that adopt children.
2. Develop polymer-fiber railroad cars to lower the cost of cross-country transportation.
3. Require all-wheel anti-lock brakes on new vehicles.
4. Divert United States Department of Agriculture loan programs from natural disaster
management to
5. Allow tech companies access to private information during police investigations to better
assist authorities.
Block 2
1. Decrease the amount of funding provided to students through federally-funded college
loan programs.
2. Develop a high-speed train system across the U.S.
3. Allow search engines increased access to personal information for advertising purposes.
4. Subsidize American steel for infrastructure.
5. Abolish daylight savings time nationally.
6. Provide liability release to companies that donate food to food pantries.
Memory for Policy Attribution
Participants are presented with the list of political policies and asked what party they remember
the policy was previously attributed to. (
Confident Republican)
Attributed Policy Liking
Participants are presented with the list of political policies, with attribution to either the
Democrat or Republican party, and asked to indicate their liking for each policy. (1: Extremely
).
True Liking
Participants are presented with the list of political policies, with no party attribution, and asked to
indicate their liking for each policy. (
Support).
Political Ideology
1. My political ideology is: (
2. Do you consider yourself more a Democrat, or more a Republican? (
Republican)

64

Political Identity Fusion
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Am one with my party.
Feel immersed in my party.
Have a deep emotional bond with my political party.
My party is me.
Will do more for my political party than any of the other group members would do.
Am strong because of my party.
Make my party strong.

Political Sophistication (Correct answers in bold)
1. Which party currently has the most members in the U.S. House of Representatives?
(Democratic Party, Republican Party, I do not know)
2. What party is more conservative than the other at the national level? (Republican Party,
Democratic Party, Neither party is more conservative than the other, I do not know)
3. What job or political office is currently held by John Roberts? (Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, Senate Majority Leader, Chair of the Democratic National Committee,
Chair of the Republican National Committee, I do not know)
4. Who is the current Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives? (Nancy Pelosi,
Marjorie Taylor-Greene, Matt Gaetz, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Ilhan Omar, Steny
Hoyer, I do not know)
5. What job or political office is now held by Kamala Harris? (U.S. Vice President, U.S.
House of Representatives Majority Leader, U.S. Secretary of Defense, U.S. Secretary of
State, I do not know)
6. Whose responsibility is it to nominate judges to the U.S. federal courts? (The U.S.
President, The U.S. Senate, The U.S. House of Representatives, The U.S. Supreme Court,
I do not know)
7. How long is the term of office for a U.S. Senator? (6 years, 2 years, 4 years, 8 years, I do
not know)
8. What branch of government determines the constitutionality of a law? (The Judicial
Branch, The Executive Branch, The Legislative Branch, I do not know)
9. How much of a majority is required for the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives to
override a presidential veto? (2/3, 1/2, 3/5, 3/4, I do not know)
10. Who is the current U.S. Secretary of State? (Anthony Blinken, Alejandro Mayorkas, Rex
Tillerson, Kristjen Nielsen, I do not know)
11. Who is the current U.S. Secretary of the Treasury? (Janet Yellen, Steven Mnuchin, Jacob
Lew, Jerome Powell, I do not know)
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Ingroup Self-Investment/Self-Definition
1:
)
Self-Investment - Solidarity
1. I feel a bond with my political party.
2. I feel solidarity with my political party.
3. I feel committed to my political party.
Self-Investment - Satisfaction
4. I am glad to be in my political party.
5. I think that my political party has a lot to be proud of.
6. It is pleasant to be in my political party.
7. Being in my political party gives me a good feeling.
Self-Investment - Centrality
8. I often think about the fact that I am in my political party.
9. The fact that I am in my political party is an important part of my identity.
10. Being in my political party is an important part of how I see myself.
Self-Definition - Individual Self-Stereotyping
11. I have a lot in common with the average person in my political party.
12. I am similar to the average person in my political party.
Self-Definition - Ingroup Homogeneity
13. People in my political party have a lot in common with each other.
14. People in my political party are very similar to each other.

66

Appendix D:
IRB Consent Form
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Appendix E:
IRB Approval Letter
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